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1 Introduction
A key objective in development economics is to work out ways to lift people out of
poverty. Access to finance has been seen as a critical factor in enabling people to
transform their production and employment activities and to exit poverty (Banerjee
and Newman 1993; Aghion and Bolton 1997; Banerjee, 2001). Countries with better
developed financial systems, it is argued, should be better able to exploit growth op-
portunities (Schumpeter, 1934; Gerschenkron 1962; Greenwood and Jovanovic, 1990;
Bencivenga and Smith, 1991). Financial development may also enhance financial
stability with positive implications for economic performance (Bernanke and Gertler,
1990). While these arguments have often provided the theoretical justification for
widespread government intervention in the banking sector, evidence on the success
of such interventions in reducing poverty remains limited.1 In this paper we use data
on the Indian rural bank branch expansion program — the largest ever attempted in
a developing country — to provide such evidence.
The Indian branch expansion program was representative of a whole host of state-
led rural finance programs that spread across the developing world in the post-colonial
period. This trend was not restricted to low income countries — in the United States,
for example, the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 requires a bank to meet the
credit needs of its entire community, including low income neighborhoods (Zinman
2002). In most cases such financial interventions went hand in hand with government
oversight of the banking sector, often aided by government ownership of banks.2
However, it is now widely believed that state control of the banking sector implied
that political, not economic, considerations determined the flow of credit across sec-
tors and individuals. Political imperatives also implied that widespread loan default
on the part of borrowers was permitted, and made the banking sector more suscepti-
ble to elite capture (La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes and Shleifer, 2003; Sapienza, 2003).
Some go as far as to claim that elite capture, combined with the imposition of interest
rate ceilings in the formal sector, led to financial dualism wherein formal subsidized
funds are concentrated in the hands of the powerful few and terms in the informal
markets (on which the poor depend) worsened (see Adams et al 1984; Braverman
and Guasch 1986; Hoﬀ and Stiglitz, 1998). In sum, it is believed that formal sub-
sidized credit was ineﬀective in reaching the poor, and may even have undermined
rural development and increased rural poverty.
However, the evidence in support of such claims remains thin. By virtue of their
vintage social banking episodes, though numerous and large in scale, have largely
escaped serious evaluation. And this is despite the fact that, even today, state provi-
sion remains the dominant source for formal finance in the rural areas of developing
1Cross country data shows that banking expansion and economic growth are positively correlated
(King and Levine, 1993; Levine and Zervos, 1998; Rajan and Zingales, 1998). However, the fact that
countries (or regions) with greater growth potential attract more banks renders a causal interpretation
problematic. In addition, the absence of comparable cross-country poverty data across time makes
working out the distributional impact of banking expansion problematic.
2La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes and Shleifer (2002) report that, in the average country, 42 percent
of the equity of the ten largest banks remained government owned in 1995.
countries (Besley 1995). This paper seeks to address this lacuna in the literature.
India is an appropriate place for such an evaluation, both because of the size and
scope of the social banking experiment and also because it is home to close to a third
of the world’s poor, the bulk of whom are located in rural areas (Deaton and Dreze,
2002).
Between bank nationalization in 1969 and the onset of financial liberalization in
1990 bank branches were opened in over 30,000 rural locations which had no prior
presence of commercial banks (henceforth, unbanked locations).3 Alongside, the
share of bank credit and savings which was accounted for by rural branches rose from
1.5 and 3 percent respectively to 15 percent each. The branch expansion program
was an integral part of India’s social banking experiment which sought to improve the
access of the rural poor to cheap formal credit. The preamble to the Bank Company
Acquisition Act of 1969 — the piece of legislation which empowered the state to
nationalize commercial banks — makes the intentions of the Indian government plain.
“The Banking system touches the lives of millions and has to be inspired
by a larger social purpose and has to subserve national priorities and ob-
jectives such as rapid growth of agriculture, small industries and exports,
raising of employment levels, encouragement of new entrepreneurs and
development of backward areas. For this purpose it is necessary for the
government to take direct responsibility for the extension and diversifica-
tion of banking services and for the working of a substantial part of the
banking system”.
Key to the rural branch expansion endeavor was the imposition of the 1:4 license
rule in 1977. This rule stated that a bank could open a branch in a location with
one or more branches (now on, a banked location) only if it opened four in unbanked
locations. This rule was abandoned in 1990. States with lower initial financial de-
velopment (as measured by the number of bank branches per capita in 1961) had a
higher incidence of unbanked locations. We use a panel data-set for the sixteen ma-
jor Indian states (1961-2000), and show that, between 1977 and 1990, the 1:4 license
rule caused financially less developed states to attract more rural branches than their
more financially developed counterparts. The reverse was true outside this period.
We show that an identical temporal and geographic pattern exists for rural poverty
— rural poverty reductions were more rapid in states with lower financial development
between 1977 and 1990. The opposite was true outside this period. In contrast, po-
litical and policy variables which may have reduced poverty in India over this period
did not show trend breaks in their relationship with initial financial development in
1977 or 1990. This allows us to use the trend breaks in 1977 and 1990 in the rela-
tionship between a state’s initial financial development and rural branch expansion
as instruments for the number of rural locations banked in a state. Our instrumental
variable estimates suggest that a one percent increase in the number of rural banked
locations reduced rural poverty by 0.36 percent and increased total output by 0.55
3Locations here refer to villages, towns and cities as defined by the Indian census.
2
percent. The output eﬀects are solely accounted for by increases in non-primary sec-
tor output — a finding which suggests that increased financial intermediation in rural
India aided output and employment diversification out of agriculture.
The rapid increase in the Indian rural branch network and rural credit and sav-
ings share after bank nationalization in 1969, and the subsequent slowdown post
1990, has been widely documented (Nair 2000). However, evidence on the impact of
the social banking program on poverty remains limited. Our findings on output line
up with Binswanger, Khandker and Rozensweig (1993) and Binswanger and Khand-
ker (1995). These papers use Indian district-level data, and find that rural branch
expansion increased non-agricultural but not agricultural growth.4 Our results are
also consistent with the simulations by Townsend and Ueda (2001) based on Thai
data which show that increased participation in the formal financial sector enhances
growth. By exploiting the policy induced reversal in the relationship between ini-
tial branch placement we are able to control for endogenous bank branch placement
and to identify the impact of rural branch expansion on poverty. Our identification
strategy is related to a number of recent program evaluation studies which exploit
policy-induced trend breaks in the variables of interest for identification purposes —
important related examples include Duflo (2001) and Almond, Chay and Greenstone
(2002).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data we use, and the
program we study. Section 3 contains our identification strategy, and Section 4 the
empirical analysis. Section 5 discusses the policy implications of our findings.
2 Data and Program Description
2.1 Data
We use a panel data-set for the sixteen major Indian states over the period 1961-2000.
We start in 1961 as it is the year of the census which preceded bank nationalization.
Also, our poverty and output series begin around this year. Table 1 gives the means
and standard deviations for our main variables and the Data Appendix information
on variable definitions and data sources.5
We use a branch level data-set which records, for every bank branch opened since
1805, the date it was opened, whether it was situated in a rural location and the
number of branches already existing in that location to construct three measures of
financial development (Reserve Bank of India, 2000).6 The number of bank branches
per 100,000 persons in a state in 1961 is our measure of initial financial development.
4Eastwood and Kohli (1999) use firm level data and find that the branch expansion program and
directed lending program enhanced small scale industrial activity in India. Our findings are also in
line with Dehejia and Lleras-Muney (2002) who find that financial development was associated with
manufacturing growth in US states between 1900 and 1940.
5The sixteen states in our sample cover over 95% of the Indian population. For some variables
the data span fewer years; details are in the Data Appendix.
6We always use the census definition of a rural location — that is, a location with a population of
less than 10,000 persons. This is the same definition used to distinguish rural from urban poverty.
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If a branch is the first to be opened in a rural location we classify it as having
opened in a rural unbanked location. In our sample states between 1961 and 2000 the
number of rural locations so banked increased from 116 to 30,428. The total number
of branches opened in rural unbanked locations per 100,000 persons is our ‘social
banking’ measure. A branch opening in a census location with at least one bank is
classified as opening in a banked location. Our third measure of financial development
is the number of branches opened in already banked locations per 100,000 persons.
Figure 1 charts the evolution of (cumulative) branch openings in banked, unbanked
and rural unbanked locations.
Every bank branch in our sample is a distinct physical entity which undertakes
both deposit-taking and lending activities.7 Deposit taking is relatively straightfor-
ward, with the interest rate and other terms and conditions laid down by the Indian
central bank. In the area of lending, bank branch oﬃcials enjoy discretion in choosing
borrowers, subject to satisfying directed lending targets for the so-called ‘priority’ sec-
tors of agriculture, entrepreneurs and small scale industry. The Indian central bank
mandates that every bank branch satisfy a credit-deposit ratio of 60 percent within
its geographical area of operation — this is to ensure that lending activities are not
concentrated in urban locales.
In 2000, the Indian rural banking sector accounted for the rupee equivalent of
26,768 million dollars as deposits and 10,834 million dollars as loans outstanding.
In terms of population reached, the rural sector accounted for 125 million savings
accounts and 25 million borrowing accounts.8 Figure 2 shows the dramatic expansion
in rural savings and credit over our sample period; the figure plots the state-wise
shares of total bank credit and savings accounted for by rural banks. Finally, in
terms of lending portfolio the average rural bank lent 38.6 percent to agriculture, 27.5
percent to industry, 13.9 percent to trade and 9 percent as personal loans (Reserve
Bank of India, 2000).
In Table 2, we use Indian household survey data to decompose rural household
debt by source for ten year intervals between 1951 and 1991. In 1951, four years after
independence, the informal credit sector accounted for the bulk of rural lending, with
moneylenders contributing close to 70 percent of the total. In contrast, less than
one percent of rural household debt came from commercial banks. These banks were
confined to urban areas and geared towards the financing of trade and commerce
activities (Reserve Bank of India, 1954).9 By 1971 lending by commercial banks
contributed only 3 percent to rural household debt. However, by 1991 this figure
7The average bank branch is staﬀed by one oﬃcer, two clerks, one of whom also acts as the
cashier, and one security guard.
8If we assume every savings account is held by a diﬀerent person and the rural population consisted
of 700 million persons in 2000, then roughly one in every five or six rural persons had a savings account
by 2000.
9These findings were published the 1951 All-India Credit Survey Report (Reserve Bank of India,
1954). It concluded that financial backwardness was a root cause of rural poverty, and that commer-
cial banks needed to be harnessed to enhance formal credit in rural areas — both to enable poor, rural
households to adopt new technologies and production processes, and to displace ‘evil’ moneylenders
who exploited their monopoly power to charge high rates of interest. These conclusions guided Indian
rural banking policy for the next four decades.
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had risen ten fold to 29 percent. Over the same time period the moneylender share
of rural household debt more than halved from 35 to 15.7 percent. Thus over this
period, arguably due to the large scale expansion of commercial banks into rural
India, commercial banks transited from being the smallest to the largest lender in
rural areas. Our focus is on identifying the economic implications of this change in
rural India.
India is unique amongst developing countries in having carried out household ex-
penditure surveys on a regular basis since the 1950s. This allows us to construct a
consistent and comparable series of rural and urban poverty measures across our pe-
riod.10 We use the head count ratio which measures the proportion of the population
below the Indian poverty line. Poverty incidence in India is high — over the 1961-2000
period 48 percent of the rural and 40 percent of the urban population are classified
as poor. Figure 3 shows the evolution of poverty across Indian states between 1961
and 1990. Up to the early 1970s there are sharp year-to-year fluctuations followed by
a downward trend in both the rural and urban series between 1973 and 1990. Imme-
diately after 1990, as India entered a period of economic liberalization, the pattern
becomes less clear with considerable debate over the net direction (Deaton 2001). The
most recent figures suggests that the post 1990 trend is overall downward. What is
even more striking, however, are the diﬀerences in poverty trajectories across states.
A key objective of this paper is to examine whether the pattern of branch expansion
into rural unbanked areas altered these rural poverty trajectories. Over this period
real male agricultural wages, an important inverse correlate of rural poverty, doubled.
Given the controversy surrounding the more recent poverty figures using agricultural
wages as an alternative dependent variable provides a useful robustness check.
Separate output estimates for the rural and urban sectors of an Indian state are
unavailable. For this reason, we focus on the sector-wise evolution of state out-
put. The primary sector which includes agriculture, forestry, fisheries and mining is
mainly rural. The secondary sector consists of construction, registered and unregis-
tered manufacturing, and electricity, water and gas output. Of these, construction
and registered manufacturing are mainly located in the urban sector, while unregis-
tered manufacturing (which consists of small businesses which employ less than ten
persons with power, or twenty without) and electricity, water and gas output have
a substantial rural presence. The tertiary sector consists of various service sectors
such as trade and transportation which occur in both rural and urban areas. In
1961 the primary sector contributed the most to total state output; however, since
the mid 1970s the growth rates in the non-primary sector exceeded those in the
primary sector (see Figure 4). We examine the links, if any, between rural branch
expansion and sector-wise increases in economic activity. Evidence both from the
economic history and economic development literatures suggests the process of struc-
tural change, where the secondary and tertiary sectors become the main contributors
to total output, is typically associated with poverty reduction (see Chenery, Robinson
10We are grateful to Gaurav Datt and Martin Ravallion for providing us these state-level poverty
figures (see Ozler, Datt and Ravallion (1996)). Gaurav Datt was kind enough to provide us with
comparable updates which allowed us to extend the series from 1994-2000.
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and Syrquin, 1986; Dehejia and Lleras-Muney, 2002; Burgess and Venables, 2003).
We also examine whether the fraction of non-agricultural laborers in the rural labor
force is aﬀected.
2.2 The Program
In 1969 the fourteen largest Indian commercial banks were nationalized, at which
point they came under the direct control of the Indian central bank and were formally
incorporated into the planning architecture of the country (Balachandran, 1998).
Bank nationalization was intended to allow the state to target financial backwardness
as a means of promoting social objectives. A central aim was to reduce and equalize
the average population per bank branch across Indian states.
To achieve this the Indian central bank adopted an area approach whereby un-
banked locations — census locations with no prior presence of commercial banks —
were targeted (Desai 1987). At any point in time, the central bank sought to fill
unbanked locations with populations exceeding a specific number. Unbanked loca-
tions in states whose population per bank branch exceeded the national average had
priority. Over time, as unbanked locations were filled, the population target was
lowered. The priority status assigned to financially less developed states, combined
with a common definition for unbanked locations across Indian states, meant that
more unbanked locations were targeted in financially backward states.
In every Indian district a commercial bank was designated as the Lead Bank and
made responsible for identifying unbanked locations (based on the criteria set by the
central bank). Every three years new (district-wise) lists of unbanked locations were
drawn up by the central bank (in consultation with Lead Banks and state development
authorities) and made available to commercial banks working in a district. The Lead
Bank was responsible for coordinating branch expansion into these locations with
other commercial banks working in the district.11
The Indian central bank, however, still needed to coerce commercial banks to
expand into unbanked, rural locations. In particular, in states where unbanked loca-
tions were remote and/or unprofitable. Under the Banking Regulation Act of 1949
commercial banks have to obtain a license from the central bank in order to open a
new branch. On January 1, 1977 the Indian central bank announced that to qualify
to open a branch in an already banked location a commercial bank must open four
in unbanked locations.12 In 1990 the licensing procedure was frozen, and in 1991
formally repealed. At this point it was deemed that future branch expansion should
depend on “need, business potential and financial viability of location” (Government
of India, 1991).
Branch level data shows that the 1:4 rule was binding — the annual ratio of bank
branches opened in unbanked locations to total branches opened stands at, or around,
11The district is the administrative unit below a state. An alternative would be undertake the
analysis at the district level. However, annual poverty and output estimates are only available at
the state level.
12Up to this point banks had enjoyed some latitude as regards branch placement as the central
bank emphasized the banking of towns and the need to satisfy pent up urban demand.
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0.8 for every year between 1977 and 1990, and falls to zero thereafter. This eﬀect
is also visible in Figure 1 which shows that from about 1975 onwards, increases in
the number of locations banked are due to increases in the number of rural locations
banked. Between 1977 and 1990 branch expansion into rural unbanked locations
accelerated while that of already banked locations fell. After 1990 branch expansion in
unbanked locations came to a halt, while that in already banked locations increased.
To date, a bank cannot close a rural branch if it is the only branch servicing the
location. The 1990 rural branch network is therefore, in eﬀect, frozen.13
The typical commercial bank in India operates in districts in both financially
developed and backward states (either as a Lead Bank or collaborator). The cen-
tral bank prioritized branch expansion in financially backward states, and this was
reflected in the unbanked location lists. Therefore, compliance with the 1:4 rule im-
plied that banks opened more branches in unbanked locations in financially backward
states. Figure 5 shows the equalization and reduction in population per bank branch
across Indian states over this period. Between 1961 and 2000 the average population
per bank branch fell tenfold from 139,790 to 14,681. There is some, albeit limited,
evidence of convergence in population per bank branch across Indian states prior
to nationalization. Convergence, however, is much stronger between 1970 and 1990,
with the post-1976 convergence driven by diﬀerential rates of rural branch expansion
across Indian states. By 1990, all states were at or below the national target of 17,000
persons per bank branch. Interestingly, after the removal of placement restrictions
in 1990 and an increase in branch building in already banked locations there is some
evidence that population per bank branch began to increase and diverge across In-
dian states with more backward states seeing larger increases (see inset panel, Figure
5).
This period also saw the central bank aﬀect the credit policies of commercial
banks. Since 1968, the central bank has mandated that a certain fraction of every
bank’s lending had to be to individuals or firms who are in the ‘priority’ sector. This
sector includes agriculture, entrepreneurs and small scale industries.14 These loans
were intended to encourage new productive activities, and were also disbursed via
rural bank branches. However, unlike rural branch expansion, the incidence of these
credit policies does not vary with a state’s initial financial development.
3 Identification Strategy
In this section we demonstrate that the bulk of rural branch expansion in India was
policy-driven and significantly increased the flows of bank credit and savings to rural
areas. The first fact allows for a credible evaluation of the branch expansion program,
and the second implies we can interpret our results as informative of the economic
13Additional credit needs of the rural population post 1990 are supposed to be met through other
means, principally microfinance (Ramachandran and Swaminathan, 2001).
14These targets were ratcheted up over time — they started at 33 percent of total bank lending and
have stood at 40 percent since 1985.
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impact of state-led financial intermediation.15
The 1:4 license rule sought to coerce commercial banks to open more branches
in rural unbanked locations in less financially developed states. The underlying as-
sumption was that financially developed states oﬀered more profitable locations for
banks and therefore, in the absence of such a rule, would attract more branches. This
suggests that if the rule had any bite its imposition in 1977 and subsequent removal
in 1990 should have altered the relationship between initial financial development of
a state and subsequent rural branch expansion. To examine this possibility we run a
fixed eﬀects regression of the form:






(Xi61 ×Dk)δk + ²it (1)
αi and βt are state and year eﬀects respectively. BRit , the number of branches opened
in rural unbanked locations per capita, is our social banking measure and Bi61, the
number of bank branches per capita in state i in 1961, our measure of initial financial
development.16 Dk is a dummy which equals one where k = t. The coeﬃcient
set γk captures the year-wise eﬀect of initial financial development on rural branch
expansion. As other initial conditions in a state may also have a time-varying eﬀect
on branch expansion we include a vector of control variables (Xi61) as additional
covariates. This vector includes log real state income per capita, population density
and the number of rural locations per capita, all measured in 1961. These controls
also enter the regression interacted with year dummies.
Figure 6 graphs the γk coeﬃcients for two specifications. The dots on the solid
line are the coeﬃcients from a specification without the Xi61 controls, and the dots
on the broken line are from a specification with the Xi61 controls. In both cases 1961
is the control year, and the 1961 dummy is omitted.17 γk summarizes the eﬀect of
between-state variation in initial financial development on the cumulative number of
branches opened in rural unbanked locations as of year t. As our dependent variable
is a cumulative variable, a comparison of the coeﬃcients for any two adjacent years
(γk and γk+1) is informative of the relationship between initial financial development
and the growth in rural branch openings.
Over this period the number of rural banked locations trend upwards in every
state. However, two clear reversals in the relationship between a state’s initial fi-
nancial development and the number of rural banked locations stand out in Figure
6 — one in 1977 and one in 1990. Between 1961 and 1977 the γk coeﬃcients increase
with time — that is, financially more developed states witness higher growth of rural
banked locations. As banks enjoyed considerable leeway regarding where to locate
15Our focus on the economic impact of bank branches sidesteps many of the endogeneity problems
associated with a direct study of the impact of credit flows. In a similar vein Jayarathne and Strahan
(1996) use information on when a U.S. state relaxed branching restrictions to examine how financial
markets aﬀect economic growth
16Both variables are normalized by 1961 population. The results are also robust to, instead,
normalizing the banking variables by land area (as in Binswanger, Khandker and Rosenzwieg 1993).
17We chose 1961 as it is the census year preceding bank nationalization. Our results are robust to
choosing any alternative year as the control year.
8
this suggests that financially more developed states oﬀered banks greater profit op-
portunities. This relationship is reversed in 1977 precisely when the 1:4 license rule
was imposed. Moreover, the reversal is not temporary. Between 1977 and 1990 the
γk coeﬃcients decrease with time — that is, financially less developed states witnessed
higher growth of rural banked locations. After 1990 rural branch expansion into rural
unbanked locations ended, and is reflected in the lack of over time variation in the
size of the γk coeﬃcients. Overall, the precise correspondence in the timing of these
trend reversals and license regime shifts provides strong prima facie evidence that
the pattern of rural branch expansion across Indian states was policy driven.
We include the vector of economic controls, Xi61, as additional controls to check
that convergence in economic activity (as proxied for by income, population density or
number of rural locations) across Indian states is not driving the observed relationship
between rural branch expansion and initial financial development. The broken line
graph in Figure 6 shows that this is not the case. If we graph out the δk coeﬃcients for
the interaction between initial state income and year dummies we find the relationship
between initial state income and rural branch expansion is throughout positive (i.e.
the graph is upward sloping). That is, controlling for initial financial development,
banks open more branches in states with higher initial state income.18
Further evidence that economic convergence does not underlie the trend reversals
in Figure 6 comes from data on branch openings in already banked locations. The 1:4
license rule linked branch expansion in already banked locations to that in unbanked
locations. Banks, however, were free to decide branch placement in already banked
locations. If the relationship between initial financial development and bank prof-
itability remained unchanged during this period, then the imposition and subsequent
removal of the 1:4 license rule should have aﬀected the rate of branch expansion in
already banked locations but not its distribution across states. To check this we
run regression (1) where the outcome variable is the cumulative number of branches
opened in banked locations per capita. Figure 7 graphs out the γk coeﬃcients on the
interaction between initial financial development of a state (Bi61) and year dummies
(Dk). This relationship, though aﬀected by license regime shifts in 1977 and 1990,
is positive throughout. This mirrors what was happening with branch openings in
rural unbanked locations pre-1977 but is in strict contrast to what was happening
between 1977 and 1990.
In Figure 8 we examine the relationship between rural bank credit and initial fi-
nancial development. That is, we report the γk coeﬃcients from regression (1) where
the dependent variable is the share of bank credit disbursed by rural branches.19 We
observe a pattern that mirrors that for rural unbanked locations (Figure 6). Disburse-
ments via rural banks are higher in more financially developed states until around
1975 when there is a trend reversal. Between 1976 and 1989 we see more backward
states experiencing a greater share of credit being disbursed via rural banks. After
1989 the relationship between rural credit share and initial financial development
18For obvious reasons, this relationship is much more muted between 1977 and 1990 if we exclude
the interaction between initial financial development and year dummies from this regression.
19Data on credit and savings flows from rural banks is only available from 1969.
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reverts to being broadly positive. A similar pattern exists for the rural savings share.
The most likely explanation for the negative relationship between credit and saving
flows and initial financial development between mid 1970s and 1990 is the higher
growth of rural branches in financially backward states. These findings put us on
stronger grounds in interpreting the economic eﬀects of rural banks as coming, at
least in part, through improved financial intermediation in rural areas.
The key trend reversals in the relationship between rural branch expansion and
initial financial intermediation occur in 1977 and 1990, with only very limited vari-
ation in this relationship in other years (Figure 6). The variation in Figure 6 can,
therefore, be summarized by a linear trend break model:
BRit = αi + βt + (Bi61 × [t− 61])γ1 + (Bi61 × [t− 76]× P77)γ2 + (2)
(Bi61 × [t− 89]× P90)γ3 + (Bi61 × P77)γ4 + (Bi61 × P90)γ5 + ²it.
The first coeﬃcient of interest, γ1, measures the trend relationship between initial
financial development (Bi61) and rural branch expansion. To check for trend reversals
in this relationship we include two further interaction terms — first, an interaction of
Bi61 with dummy variable which equals one post 1976 (P77) and a post 1976 time
trend (t−76), and second, an interaction of Bi61 with a dummy variable which equals
one post 1990 (P90) and a post 1989 time trend (t−89). To allow for intercept changes
we also include the interactions of Bi61 with P77 and P90 respectively. Finally, we
always include the set of additional controls Xi61, entered in the regression in the
same way as Bi61. A standard concern with diﬀerence in diﬀerence estimation using
panel data is serial correlation. Therefore in all regressions we cluster our standard
errors by state. This procedure gives us an estimator of the variance covariance
matrix which is consistent in the presence of any correlation pattern within states
over time (Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan, 2002).20
Column (1) in Table 3 reports the trend break model results for branch expansion
into rural unbanked locations. Both the 1977 and 1990 trend reversals are statistically
significant which lines up with the pattern observed in Figure 6. It is useful to
interpret the reported coeﬃcients with reference to the states at the 25th and 75th
percentile of the initial financial development distribution — Madhya Pradesh and
Tamil Nadu respectively. The initial financial development of these two states diﬀer
by one point. The coeﬃcient γ1, given in the first row, tells us that between 1961
and 1976, relative to Madhya Pradesh, 0.08 additional rural locations per capita were
banked in Tamil Nadu. The second row, which reports γ2, shows that this positive
trend was reversed between 1977 and 1990 with 0.16 fewer rural locations receiving
a branch in Tamil Nadu annually relative to Madhya Pradesh.21 Finally, the third
row, which reports γ3, tells us that after 1989 no rural branch expansion occurred
and hence, Tamil Nadu and Madhya Pradesh were equally likely to receive rural
20As Bertrand et al (2002) demonstrate for the US rejection rates using this method do increase
above 5 percent when the number of states falls below 20. As we only have 16 states in India the
significance levels we obtain using this method should be treated as conservative.
21This is given by γ1 + γ2. F -test 1 shows that γ1 + γ2 is significantly diﬀerent from zero.
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branches.22 In contrast, and in line with Figure 7, the results for branch expansion
into banked locations shown in column (2) do not show any trend reversals.
Columns (3) and (4) consider the relationship between the shares of bank credit
and savings disbursed by rural branches and initial financial development.23 Prior
to 1977 both variables are uncorrelated with initial financial development. However,
between 1977 and 1990 both are significantly negatively correlated with initial finan-
cial development. Rural credit share exhibits a second trend reversal in 1990 with
rural credit and initial financial development unrelated after 1990. Rural savings,
however, remain negatively related with initial financial development post 1990. In
column (5) we find no evidence of trend reversals in the case of the share of bank
lending going to priority sectors. This makes sense as priority sector targets were
set at the bank-level, and remained independent of the state-wise distribution of a
commercial bank’s rural and urban branches. In a similar vein in column (6) we see
no trend breaks in the relationship between the share of formal credit disbursed by
rural credit cooperatives and initial financial development.24 The fact that the trend
breaks are only observed for variables which were directly aﬀected by licensing rule
increases our confidence that the observed trend reversals are policy-driven.
4 Eﬀects on Rural Development
The exposure of an Indian state to the rural branch expansion program was jointly
determined by its initial financial development and the license regime shifts in 1977
and 1990. Between 1977 and 1990 initial financial development and rural branch
expansion were negatively correlated, with the reverse true outside this time-period.
We exploit this fact to provide two types of evidence on the link between rural
development and rural branch expansion. In section 4.1 we check whether rural
development outcomes also exhibit trend breaks in 1977 and 1990 in their relationship
with initial financial development, and in section 4.2 we use these trend breaks as
instruments for rural branch expansion.
4.1 Reduced Form Evidence
Basic Results
We start by examining the relationship between initial financial development and
poverty outcomes. The bold line in Figure 9 traces out the γk coeﬃcients for a
regression (of the form in equation (1)) where rural poverty is the dependent variable,
and the dotted line the γk coeﬃcients from a regression where urban poverty is the
dependent variable. Each γk summarizes the eﬀect of between state variation in
initial financial development on poverty in year t. The pattern across years thus
tells how poverty rose or fell in relation to the financial development of a state. In
22γ1+ γ2+γ3 equals zero. F -test 2 shows that γ1+ γ2+ γ3 does not diﬀer significantly from zero.
23These data are only available from 1969.
24Credit cooperatives were the other main source of formal credit in rural areas across the 1961-
2000 period.
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interpreting these coeﬃcients it is useful to remember that over our sample period
both rural and urban poverty series trend downwards (Figure 3). Figure 9 shows
that between 1970 and 1978 both rural and urban poverty correlate negatively with
financial development. That is poverty falls more rapidly in states with higher initial
financial development. After this the two series diverge. The urban poverty series
flattens out in 1978 with the γk coeﬃcients close to zero until 1990. In contrast,
the rural poverty series continues its downward trend until the early 1980s after
which rural poverty reductions are more pronounced in less developed states until
1990.25 After 1990 both series return to being negatively correlated with financial
development as they were pre-1978. The plot for rural poverty in Figure 9 is thus the
inverse of that for rural branch expansion in Figure 6. Backward states, in contrast,
did not experience more rapid urban poverty reduction between 1977 and 1990. This
matches up with the fact that branch expansion into urban locales which tended to
be already banked was higher in financially developed states throughout the period
(Figure 7).
In Table 4 we summarize these, and other, findings for poverty outcomes using
our basic trend break model (see equation (2)). In column (1) we observe that rural
poverty reduction is more rapid in financially developed states both before 1977 and
after 1990. This trend is, however, reversed between 1977 and 1990. Comparing the
states at the 25th (Madhya Pradesh) and 75th percentile (Tamil Nadu) of the initial
financial development distribution these coeﬃcients imply that annual reductions in
the rural head count ratio were 0.77 percent higher in Tamil Nadu than Madhya
Pradesh before 1977. However, between 1977 and 1990 this trend was reversed with
Madhya Pradesh experiencing a 1.15 percent more rural poverty reduction per year
relative to Tamil Nadu. There is then a second reversal in 1990 when rural branch
expansion is discontinued. After this year the more developed state (Tamil Nadu)
experiences 1.15 percent more rural poverty reduction per year relative to the more
backward state (Madhya Pradesh). These results strongly suggest that more rapid
expansion of rural bank branches into more financially backward states during the
1977-1990 period is aﬀecting poverty reduction in these states relative to what was
happening in more financially developed states.
Consistent with the fact that we are evaluating a rural program, column (2) shows
that initial financial development and urban poverty reductions are unrelated. Rural
poverty tends to lie above urban poverty in India (see Figure 3). The results in
columns (1) and (2) imply that results for the diﬀerence between rural and urban
poverty will mirror those for rural poverty. The closing of the gap between rural and
urban poverty will be more rapid in more financially developed states pre-1977 and
post-1990. In contrast between 1977 and 1990 it will be more backward states that
are experiencing more rapid closing of their rural-urban poverty gaps. The results
for aggregate poverty in column (3) also mirror those for rural poverty in column (1)
and tell us that changes in rural poverty drive the aggregate pattern.
25We would expect there to be a lag between the opening of rural branches and their exerting
any eﬀect on rural poverty. This may explain why trend breaks in poverty lead those in branch
expansion.
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In column (4) we see that the results for real daily male agricultural wages mirror
those for rural poverty. Relative to financially developed states, agricultural wages in
financially backward states grew more quickly only between 1977 and 1990. Column
(4) serves as a robustness check on our poverty results, and points to an impor-
tant route through which rural branch expansion may have reduced poverty. As a
robustness check we show in column (5) that real wages for workers in registered
manufacturing — which is mainly located in the urban sector — do not exhibit breaks
in 1977 and 1990.
Table 5 considers diﬀerent components of state output. Column (1) tells us that
the relationship between state output per capita and initial financial development
exhibited trend reversals in 1977 and 1990. Evaluated at the sample mean, and
comparing states at the 25th and 75th percentile of the initial financial development
distribution, the point estimates imply that, prior to 1977 annual increases in total
output were 18.5 Rupees per capita lower in Madhya Pradesh than Tamil Nadu. Be-
tween 1977 and 1990, this trend was exactly reversed. Post 1990 the pattern is both
reversed and magnified. In columns (2) and (3) we see that this pattern is not shared
by primary sector output, or within this sector agricultural output.26 In column (4)
we see that non-primary sector output drove the growth in total output, with the
latter also exhibiting trend breaks in 1977 and 1990. Columns (5)-(8) focus in on the
diﬀerent components of the secondary sector. Initial financial development is uncor-
related with construction output and registered manufacturing output. Both these
activities are concentrated in the urban sector. In contrast, column (7) shows that
unregistered manufacturing and initial financial development are positively correlated
until 1977, negatively between 1977 and 1990 and positively thereafter. The small
businesses which make up unregistered manufacturing are important contributors to
non-agricultural output in the rural sector (Visaria and Basant, 1994). Electricity,
water and gas output is also negatively correlated with initial financial development
after 1977 — this, possibly, also reflects the increase in rural non-agricultural activities.
In column (9) we examine tertiary sector output. Between 1977 and 1990 tertiary
sector output is lower in financially developed states. The opposite is true outside
this period. Consistent with the thesis that the branch expansion program increased
rural non-primary sector output, in column (10) we observe that while before 1977
financially developed states witnessed faster growth in the share of non-agricultural
laborers in total unskilled rural labor, this trend is reversed between 1977 and 1987.27
Robustness
We interpret the observed trend breaks in the rural development outcomes and initial
financial development relationship as reflecting the economic eﬀects of rural branch
expansion. We have provided evidence that these changes were caused by the 1:4
license rule, not by a reversal in the relationship between an Indian state’s initial
financial development and potential for economic growth after 1977. A diﬀerent
26We have checked that the results are unaﬀected if we instead use agricultural output per hectare
as our dependent variable
27As our data series ends in 1987 we cannot check for a 1990 trend break in employment
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source of potential omitted variable bias is poverty alleviation policies pursued by
state governments. In our estimation framework this is a cause of concern if key
political and policy variables which have the potential to influence rural development
exhibited trend reversals in their relationship with initial financial development at
the same points as rural branch expansion. Table 6 examines this possibility.
The Congress party which had been the dominant party in Indian politics since
independence suﬀered a major electoral setback in 1977.28 A first concern is that
the extent of state-wise ousting of Congress may have been systematically related to
both the state’s initial financial development and the subsequent choice of state-level
public policies. Column (1), Table 6, however, finds no evidence of trend breaks
in the relationship between the fraction of Congress legislators and initial financial
development in 1977 or 1990. A second concern is that the 1977 political shock
realigned political interests between the center and states with possible implications
for resource flows. More backward states, for example, may have received more federal
resources post-1977 as a result of this reconfiguration.29 However, in column (2) we
find no evidence of trend breaks in the relationship between center-state alignment, as
measured by whether the same party is in power in both places, and initial financial
development.
The remainder of Table 6 considers an array of state-level anti-poverty policies.
In the first few decades after independence land reform as a program for ushering in
a just social order was an important item on almost every state government’s policy
agenda (Besley and Burgess, 2000; Banerjee, Gertler and Ghatak, 2002). Using state
panel data 1958-1992 Besley and Burgess (2000) show that this land reform measure
reduced rural poverty. We, however, in column (3) we find no evidence of trend
breaks in the relationship the cumulative number of land reform acts passed by a
state government bears to initial financial development. In column (4) we examine
the relationship between the extent of public food distribution in a state and its initial
financial development.30 The use of this program as a major poverty alleviation
policy increased in the 1970s, with its incidence showing substantial variation across
states (Besley and Burgess, 2002). However, again, we see no evidence of trend
breaks. Finally, in columns (5) and (6) we directly consider the shares of government
spending going to sectors which have the potential to impact rural development —
spending on education and health , and other development spending. We find no
evidence of trend breaks for these variables.
These findings suggest that our identification strategy is reasonable and that rural
branch expansion aﬀected rural, but not urban, outcomes. We now turn to a more
structural analysis of the impact of rural branches on rural development outcomes.
28This setback was linked to Indira Gandhi’s decision to invoke a State of Emergency in 1975 as
a means of remaining in power — a decision which tainted herself and her party. The proportion of
Congress seats in state assemblies fell from 0.56 in 1976 to 0.25 in 1978.
29Dasgupta, Dhillon and Dutta [2001] show that state governments who were politically aligned
with central government received greater transfers between 1968 and 1997.
30The Indian public food distribution system seeks to enhance the real incomes of poor households,
and protect them against food shocks.
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4.2 Instrumental Variables Evidence
It is useful to start with the OLS results for the relationship between rural bank
branch expansion and rural poverty.31 Column (1), Table 7 reports the results for
rural head count ratio. The coeﬃcient on the number of branches opened in rural
unbanked locations is positive and significant. The positive relationship persists, but
is statistically insignificant, once we include the interaction between a state’s initial
financial development and a time trend, and the vector of state initial conditions as
additional covariates, column (2).32 Naively interpreted, these OLS results suggest
that rural branch expansion increased rural poverty. However, an alternative ‘pro-
gram’ based explanation is that the OLS estimate reflects the fact that poorer, less
developed states attracted more rural branches between 1977 and 1990.
To take account of endogenous branch placement we use deviations in the trend
relationship between initial financial development and rural branch expansion which
were induced by license regime shifts in 1977 and 1990 as instruments for branch
openings in rural unbanked locations. This is equivalent to a diﬀerence in diﬀerence
estimator where we control for the systematic variation in branch expansion across
states and time by including state and year fixed eﬀects and a time trend interacted
with initial financial development, and only consider the interaction between initial
financial development and whether a state is in a treatment or control period as
exogenous. Here, we have two ‘control’ periods (1961-1976 and 1990-2000) and one
‘treatment’ period (1977-1989).
The first stage regression is as in column (1), Table 3, and the second stage
regression takes the form:
yit = αi+βt+λBRit + η1([t− 61]×Bi61)+ η2(P77×Bi61) + η3(P90×Bi61) +uit (3)
where P77 × [t − 76] × Bi61 and P90 × [t − 89] × Bi61 are instruments for BRit . This
strategy assumes that the instruments aﬀect rural development only via their eﬀect on
rural branch expansion. Table 6 showed that a range of political and policy variables
which might aﬀect rural development were orthogonal to our instruments. We also
report over-identification tests of the validity of this assumption (Sargan (1958)).
Columns (3) - (5) of Table 7 report IV estimates for poverty outcomes. The point
estimate on rural branches in column (3) imply that one additional bank branch per
100,000 persons reduces rural poverty by 4.7 percent.33 Evaluated at the sample
average, our results implies that rural branch expansion in India can explain a 15
percent reduction in the head count ratio. This finding lines up with the reduced
form evidence but is in strict contrast with the OLS results. In column (4) we find
no evidence that rural branch expansion aﬀected urban poverty. This increases our
31The OLS regression is of the form yit = αi+βt+λBRit + εit, where yit is the outcome of interest
and BRit is the cumulative number of branches opened in rural unbanked locations per capita.
32The coeﬃcient on initial financial development time trend interaction term shows that rural
poverty was throughout lower in more financially developed states.
33The point estimate for the marginal eﬀect of rural banks on poverty is -4.74, while the sample
means for rural poverty and rural banked locations is 48.1 and 3.7 respectively. This gives an elasticity
of rural poverty to rural branch expansion evaluated at the sample means of -0.36
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confidence that we are identifying the poverty impact of banking rural locations.
Also given that our explanatory variable is a cumulative stock and that rural and
urban poverty trend downwards this finding reduces concerns that we are capturing
a trend eﬀect.34 Column (5) summarizes the overall poverty impact of the rural
branch expansion program. Opening a bank branch in one additional rural location
per 100,000 persons lowers aggregate head count ratio by 4 percentage points.
In columns (6)-(8) we check whether our results for rural head count ratio are
robust to alternative specifications. First, we check the robustness of our results
to using a single control period. In column (6) we restrict the sample to the pre-
treatment (1961-1976) and treatment period (1977-1989) and use a single instrument
— P77 × [t − 76]× Bi61. In column (7) we, instead, restrict the sample to the treat-
ment and post-treatment periods (1977-2000). Here, our instrument for rural branch
expansion is P90 × [t− 89]×Bi61. In both cases rural branch openings reduce rural
poverty; however, the magnitude is larger in the second case. A possible interpre-
tation is that during the control period 1990-2000 financial liberalization exerted
independent eﬀects on rural poverty. Second, we check the sensitivity of our findings
to sample restrictions. We are using poverty estimates constructed by Ozler, Datt
and Ravallion (1996) from Indian National Sample Survey household-level data. For
years in which the survey was not conducted, the authors use weighted interpolation
to construct poverty measures. In column (8) we show that our results for rural head
count ratio are robust to restricting the regression only to years in which NSS surveys
were conducted.
The operation of casual agricultural labor as a ‘last resort’ employment option
underlines its link with poverty and a range of studies suggest that agricultural wages
are an important and independent marker of rural welfare (Dreze and Mukherjee,
1991; Deaton and Dreze, 2002). In column (9) we see that opening a bank branch
in an additional rural location increases agricultural wages. This may in part reflect
a tightening of the agricultural labor market due to access to banks leading to rise
in non-agricultural activities. Through this mechanism agricultural laborers may
benefit from rural branch expansion even if they do not directly transact with rural
banks. Given the debates surrounding the accuracy of the Indian poverty figures for
the 1990s (see Deaton 2001; Deaton and Dreze 2002) it is also comforting to see the
impact of rural branch expansion being felt on an independently collected, separate
measure of welfare. In contrast, we find no evidence that factory wages are aﬀected
by rural branch expansion, column (10).
A key mechanism through which we may expect rural branch expansion to af-
fect rural poverty is economic growth and diversification. Table 8 examines diﬀerent
elements of state domestic product in India. Rural branch expansion increases log
state income per capita, column (1) and this occurs through eﬀects on non-primary
sector output. Columns (2) and (3) show that rural branch expansion exerts no
direct eﬀect on the primary sector output, or, within it, agricultural output.35 In
34Consistent with this we also find that rural branch expansion reduces the gap between rural and
urban poverty — a variable which exhibits no clear trend over the period (see Figure 3).
35The absence of an eﬀect in the agricultural sector is striking as raising agricultural productivity
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contrast, opening a bank branch in an additional rural location significantly raises
secondary sector output — the eﬀects in this sector are driven by unregistered man-
ufacturing and electricity, water and gas. The estimated elasticities suggest a one
to one correspondence between bank branch expansion and increases in unregistered
manufacturing/electricity, water and gas output. The fact that we are finding sig-
nificant eﬀects for unregistered manufacturing which has a significant rural presence
but not for registered manufacturing which is predominately urban is important. In
column (9) we find a similar eﬀect for the tertiary or services sector. Finally, rural
branch expansion and the share of rural labor employed in non agricultural activities
are positively associated. This is consistent with the thesis that a movement of labor
out of agriculture contributed to the increase in agricultural wages. The relationship,
however, is statistically insignificant once we cluster standard errors at the state-level.
Taken together, these results suggest the rural poverty results we observe may be in
part be accounted for by rural banking facilitating structural change in the rural
economy.
Robustness
We conclude our empirical analysis with two types of robustness checks on our results.
First, we show that increases in the share of rural credit and savings aﬀect poverty
and output outcomes in a manner similar to rural banks. This is evidence that the
poverty and output impact of rural branch expansion was linked to increased financial
intermediation in rural India. Second, we check the robustness of our findings to
including as co-variates an array of time-varying policy and political variables which
are known to aﬀect poverty.
In Table 3 we saw that rural credit and rural saving shares exhibit trend reversals
in their relationship with initial financial development in 1977 and, in the case of rural
credit, in 1990 as well. This suggests that we can replicate the above IV procedure,
where we, instead, measure financial intermediation by rural credit or savings share.
The results are in Table 9. Columns (1)-(4) tell us that increases in rural credit
and saving shares reduces rural, but not urban, poverty. A one percentage point
increase in the share of credit disbursed by rural branches reduces rural poverty by
1.49 percent, while a one percentage point increase in rural saving reduces poverty by
2.2 percent. Columns (5)-(10) consider output variables. Columns (5) and (6) show
that increases in rural credit and savings are associated with increases in total output.
In columns (9) and (10) we see that these results are driven by increases increase in
the rural credit and savings share leading to increase in non-primary output. In
contrast, columns (7) and (8) show that primary output is unaﬀected.
In Table 10, we revisit the role of time-varying political and policy variables in
driving poverty reductions in rural India. For expositional ease, we only present
results for rural and urban head count ratio — however, all other results are also
robust to the inclusion of these controls. In column (1) we include a cumulative
was a central objective of the program. Our results are, however, in line with previous findings form
India (Binswanger et al, 1993, 1995). These authors find a very small, and mostly insignificant, eﬀect
of branch expansion on gross crop output.
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index of land reform acts passed by a state as an explanatory variable. In line with
previous studies, we find increases in land reform reduces rural poverty. However, the
eﬀect of branch expansion on rural poverty is robust to this change in specification.
In column (2) we add two state-level expenditure measures - spending on health
and education, and other development spending. The latter category includes state
spending on agriculture, rural development, irrigation, public works and community
development programs. Both types of spending are important elements of a state’s
poverty reduction eﬀorts. We, however, find that rural head count ratio is negatively
correlated only with other development spending. We continue to find a negative
relationship between rural branch expansion and rural poverty. And rural banks
continue to exert a negative influence on rural poverty. In column (3) we directly
control for the political make-up of state legislatures. Political parties in India diﬀer
with respect to both their commitment to redistribution, and the groups in whose
favor they redistribute. We find the political make-up of state legislature does not
aﬀect the poverty outcomes and with the full set of additional controls included the
eﬀect of rural banks on rural poverty remains robust. Finally, in columns (4)-(6) we
carry out the same exercise for urban head count ratio and find no impact of rural
bank branches, land reform, development spending or political composition on urban
poverty.
5 Discussion
A central question in the literature on finance and development is whether specific
interventions can be identified which are capable of reducing poverty and promoting
growth. Despite the existence of a large cross-country literature on finance and devel-
opment, and a large theoretical and case study literature which suggests that credit
market imperfections may constrain development we remain largely in the dark on
the issue of whether and how to intervene. This paper uses data from the Indian
social banking experiment program to shed some light on this issue. State led bank
branch expansions have been an important means of expanding access to finance in
low income countries in the post colonial period. Despite their importance, these pro-
grams have rarely been evaluated but are often condemned. An important criticism
is that elite capture has rendered the bulk of state-led credit programs ineﬀective.
This, in turn, has led to calls to replace banks with microfinance operations.
To address this lacuna in the literature we exploit the policy-driven nature of the
Indian rural branch expansion program to evaluate its impact on rural poverty. Our
central finding is that this program significantly reduced rural poverty, while leaving
urban poverty unaﬀected. Moreover the magnitudes of the eﬀects we find are large.
Over our sample period aggregate poverty in India peaked in 1967 when 61 percent
of the population was beneath the poverty line. This number fell to 31 percent by
2000. Evaluated at the sample mean, the coeﬃcients in Tables 7 tell us that rural
branch expansion can explain roughly half of this fall in rural poverty. This suggests
that lack of access to finance may be an important reason why poor people stay poor.
Our findings also go some way towards counteracting the widespread pessimism which
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surround state intervention in rural credit markets. Though we make no claim as to
the transferability of our results to other settings these are, nonetheless, important
results which suggest a need to reconsider rural banking as a mechanism for attacking
poverty.
But how were the eﬀects we observe on rural poverty achieved? A second con-
tribution of the paper is to tease out some of the pathways. Our findings relate to
an older literature which views structural change as key driver of economic develop-
ment and poverty reduction (see Lewis, 1954; Kaldor, 1967; Banerjee and Newman,
1993). It is well documented that returns from non-primary sector activities typically
exceed those from agriculture. We find that rural branch expansion was associated
with increases in secondary and tertiary sector output. Within these sectors we iden-
tify unregistered or informal manufacturing and service sector as key beneficiaries
of rural branch expansion. In a similar vein, within the unskilled rural labor force,
rural banking increased non-agricultural employment at the expense of agricultural
employment. This tightening of the agricultural labor market is also reflected in a
rise in male agricultural wages. The program also appears to have enjoyed success in
displacing the traditional moneylender (see Table 2). Throughout this period mon-
eylender interest rates exceeded those charged by commercial banks (see Banerjee,
2001). Rural banks thus provided the rural populations access to cheaper credit than
was previously available.36
Three features of the Indian social banking program appear to be important in
accounting for its success in reducing poverty. First, the branch licensing rule suc-
ceeded in coercing commercial banks to open branches in backward rural locations.
Without state coercion it is unlikely that the vast majority of India’s rural poor would
have been reached by banking services. Recent case study evidence also suggests that
microfinance programs, which have been strongly promoted since the end of branch
expansion in 1990, have been less successful in reaching backward areas (Ramachan-
dran and Swaminathan, 2001). Second, it appears that rural banks managed to reach
the rural poor. In Table 11 we use a pooled sample of 74,992 households from the
1983, 1987 and 1993 Employment/Unemployment rounds of National Sample Survey
to examine how bank and moneylender debt incidence varies with land ownership (a
good proxy of wealth in rural settings). We see that a landless household is about
as likely to get a bank loan as a household with more than 2.5 acres of land. This
distribution is markedly more uniform than that for moneylender borrowing.37 This
evidence goes against the oft cited elite capture story (Adams et al, 1984). It also
stands in stark contrast to those reported for other developing countries (e.g. Brazil
36Entry of a bank oﬀering subsidized loans may also have exerted downward pressure on interest
rates charged by moneylenders. The net direction of this eﬀect is ex ante unclear (see Hoﬀ and Stiglitz
(1998)) and the lack of comparable and consistent data on moneylender interest rates prevents us
from testing directly for this eﬀect in our data.
37The story for credit flows is similar. At the height of the social banking program in 1985 marginal
farmers (those with less than 2.5 acres of land) accounted for 12.2 percent of operational land holdings
but 33 percent for bank short term agricultural credit. In contrast, large farmers (with more than
5 acres of land) controlled 73.7 percent of operational land holdings but only received 38 percent of
the short term credit (Reserve Bank of India, 1989).
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and Costa Rica — see Besley 1995). It is also worth noting that microfinance programs
in Bangladesh has often faced problems getting through to the poorest (Morduch,
1999). Third, commercial banks oﬀered opportunities for households to save (Ta-
ble 9). Savings accounts likely provided households with the means of accumulating
capital which could be used to invest in various productive activities. Microfinance
operations, in contrast, tend not to oﬀer this option with the focus being on short
term loans with frequent repayment.
It is, however, premature to conclude that social banking is the optimal policy
response to the problem of widespread rural poverty. The branch expansion program
ended in 1990 because of the heavy toll it exacted on the balance sheets of com-
mercial banks. A key cause was high loan default rates — the average default rate
for commercial banks during the 1980s stood at 42 percent (as a share of all loans
due for repayment). Default rates were very similar across types of borrower — a
finding consistent with poor monitoring of borrowers at all levels, and the fact that
large scale loan defaults were very often politically condoned (Reserve Bank of India,
1989). Another factor contributing to high program costs was rural interest rate
subsidies — during the 1980s the average interest rate on loans from rural branches
was 11 percent as against 14 percent in urban branches.
From a policy design viewpoint, the fact that rural branches were a vehicle for
costly redistribution of resources to rural areas is, in itself, not a damning criticism of
the program. It is well-known that, in the presence of informational asymmetries, it
may be optimal for a government that wishes to target resources to particular groups
of citizens to undertake costly redistribution in order to best screen amongst citizens
(Besley and Coate, 1992). It is clear that the Indian government sought to use the
social banking program to redistribute resources to the rural poor. This suggests that
the relevant policy question is, whether, in the class of costly redistributive programs,
the social banking program was the most cost-eﬀective.
The cost eﬀectiveness comparison with microfinance is especially germane since
the widespread perception that development banks are both costly and ineﬀective
has led to widespread calls that they be replaced by microfinance operations. This is
true both for India post-1990 and more broadly for low income countries as a whole
(Morduch, 1999).38 Unfortunately, lack of comparable data on microfinance schemes
in India makes a direct comparison infeasible. We can, however, get a ‘back of the
envelope’ feel for the cost-benefit ratio for our program and compare this to ratios
for microfinance programs in Bangladesh reported in Morduch (1999). Whilst not
wishing to read too much into this exercise — due to the assumptions involved in the
calculation and the problems of comparison across counties — it is, nonetheless, of
interest to see whether our ratio lies in the ballpark of the microfinance ratios.
Our cost figures come from an evaluation of the program carried out by the Indian
central bank in 1986 (Reserve Bank of India, 1989). For each 100 rupees of working
38The Indian central bank task force on microfinance (1997) stated, ‘To achieve a process of change
leading to empowerment of 7.5 million poor households, and more particularly of the women from
these households, through strong and viable people’s structures like Self help groups and micro-
finance institutions which draw strength and support from the banking system with the message
that banking with the poor is a profitable business opportunity for both the poor and the banks’.
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funds the average rural branch received 11.5 rupees as interest on loans, paid 7.3
rupees as interest on deposits and had variable costs of 4.8 rupees (these include
manpower and other expenses). The average rural branch, therefore, made a loss
of 0.6 rupees per 100 rupees of working funds. The revenue position of a branch,
however, was significantly worsened by the fact only 58 percent of loans were repaid.
This increases the loss to 5.4 rupees per 100 rupees. We use our total deposits and
total advances figures to compute the real loss per bank branch per capita in 1986
(498.13 rupees). To calculate benefits we take the coeﬃcient (0.08) — which we obtain
from regressing rural banks per capita on log state income per capita in column (1) of
Table 8 — and multiply it by the real state output per capita in 1986 (1020.2 rupees)
to get a real benefit figure in 1986 of 183.45 per bank branch per capita. Dividing
costs by benefits gives a cost benefit ratio of 2.72. That is it costs 2.72 rupees to
generate an additional rupee of state income via the social banking program.
This figure exceeds the cost benefit ratio of 0.91 that Khandker (1998) reports for
improvements in household expenditure via borrowing by women from the Grameen
Bank and of 1.48 for borrowing by men. Our figure of 2.72 is, however, in the ballpark
of the ratios of 3.53 and 2.59 for borrowing from BRAC, the second largest microfi-
nance lender in Bangladesh, by women and men, respectively (Khandker, 1998). And
this is the case even when the default rate is at 42 percent. If we assume no default
then our cost benefit ratio at 0.31 is well below even the Grameen ratios. If we take
a default rate of 7.8 percent which is the average that Morduch (1999) reports for
the Grameen Bank over the 1985-1996 period then our ratio rises to 0.75 which is
close to the Grameen ratio for women. These comparisons, though rough, do bring
out the fact that a key advantage of microfinance lies in its superior ability to enforce
repayment of loans.39
This simple comparison, however, also suggests that no easy ranking of microfi-
nance and social banking as regards cost eﬀectiveness is possible. Both confer sig-
nificant benefits as measured in terms of increased expenditure or income. However,
both types of schemes also incur significant subsidies. The demonstrated advantage
of microfinance in terms of repayment needs to be balanced against disadvantages
in terms of reaching the poorest individuals and localities.40 One clear thing that
we do learn from this paper is that coercion is needed to expand formal credit into
backward rural areas and to force banks to lend to poorer individuals. And here
government may have some advantages in terms of coordination, legal powers and re-
sources. There is also the issue of whether providing a savings function is important.
The fact that a number of microfinance operations are evolving into banks which
oﬀer this service suggests that it may be.
In 1998 India accounted for a third of the people in the developing world living
below the dollar a day poverty line. That the rural branch expansion managed to
39It is also clear that there is scope for banks to increase lending rates as a means of reducing costs
as even microfinance operations charge higher nominal rates than those on oﬀer from rural banks.
The problem with this strategy as Morduch (1999) points out is that one runs the risk of excluding
the poor.
40Reaching the poorest in rural areas who are often involved in subsistence agriculture and who
cannot make frequent repayments, for example, is problematic.
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make a significant dent on the numbers in poverty during the 1961-2000 period is the
key finding of this paper. It suggests that expanding access to finance in poor, rural
settings can generate significant social returns. It also points to the need to identifying
specific interventions which facilitate the adoption of new production activities and
lead to structural change, growth and poverty. Our analysis is limited to a specific
policy episode. Whether rural branch expansion would be eﬀective in other settings
and whether resources would be better spent on other types of programs remain open
questions. Nonetheless it does appear to be an opportune moment to reexamine
whether rural banks can be harnessed to attack rural poverty.
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6 Data Appendix
The data used in the paper come from a wide variety of sources.41 The data cover the
sixteen main Indian states, and unless mentioned otherwise the period 1961-2000.42
Haryana split from the state of Punjab in 1965 and enters our sample in 1965.
Deflators and Population Variables expressed in real terms are deflated using the
Consumer Price Index for Agricultural Laborers (CPIAL) and Consumer Price Index
for Industrial Workers (CPIIW). These are drawn from the Indian Labor Handbook,
the Indian Labor Journal, the Indian Labor Gazette and the Reserve Bank of India
Report on Currency and Finance. Ozler, Datt and Ravallion [1996] have further
corrected CPIAL and CPIIW to take account of inter-state cost of living diﬀerentials
and have also adjusted CPIAL to take account of rising firewood prices. The reference
period for the deflator is October 1973-March 1974. Post-1994 we update this series
using the Indian Labor Journal (CPIIW) and the Monthly Abstract of Statistics
(CPIAL). Post-1995 we do not adjust for firewood prices. We normalize all series
by the state’s population in 1961, which comes from the decennial census [Census
of India, Registrar General and Census Commissioner, Government of India]. The
number of rural locations in a state in 1961 is also from this source — the census terms
a location as rural if it has a population of less than 10,000. In line with this, we
include all towns with a population less than 10,000 and all villages with population
between 2,000 and 10,000.
Banking data refers to scheduled commercial banks.43 The bank branch data is
from Reserve Bank of India [2000] which uses the census definition of rural locations.
The initial financial development of a state is the number of bank branches in that
state in 1961 per 10,000 population. A location is categorized as banked if it has at
least one branch of any commercial or cooperative bank. Two bank branch variables
are defined: the number of branches opened in rural locations with no prior presence
of commercial banks (rural unbanked locations), and the number of branches opened
in already banked locations. Rural credit share is the proportion of total advances
outstanding of commercial banks which are disbursed by rural branches. Rural saving
share is similarly defined. Share of priority sector lending is the fraction of bank
credit going to the priority sectors. These three variables are available from 1969-
2000. Cooperative lending share is the fraction of total bank and cooperative credit
which is accounted for by primary agricultural cooperatives. Data on bank credit
and saving is from the Reserve Bank of India publication Statistical Tables Relating
to Banks in India.
41The data-set builds on Ozler, Datt and Ravallion [1996] which collects published data on poverty,
output, wages, price indices and population to construct a consistent panel data set on Indian states
[1958-1992]. We are grateful to Martin Ravallion for providing the data, and to Gaurav Datt for
answering various queries. We have added information on bank location and credit outcomes, state
income, rural employment, infrastructure and public finances of Indian states.
42The states in the sample are: Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Gujarat, Haryana, Jammu and
Kashmir, Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa, Punjab, Rajasthan, Tamil
Nadu, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal
43This category includes (1) State Bank of India and its associates, (2) Nationalized banks, (3)
Regional rural banks, (4) Private sector banks, and (5) Foreign banks.
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Poverty figures are for rural and urban areas of India’s 16 major states. 1961-1992
figures were put together by Ozler, Datt and Ravallion [1996], and the 1993-2000
update which uses the same methodology was provided by Gaurav Datt. Data is
missing for Jammu-Kashmir after 1991, giving 627 observations. These measures are
based on 25 rounds of the National Sample Survey (NSS) which span this period.
44 The NSS rounds are also not evenly spaced: the average interval between the
midpoints of the surveys ranges from 0.9 to 5.5 years. Surveys were carried out in
the following years 1961, 1962, 1963, 1965, 1966, 1967, 1968, 1969, 1970, 1971, 1973,
1974, 1978, 1983, 1987, 1988, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 2000.
Because other data is typically available on a yearly basis weighted interpolation has
been used to generate poverty measures for years where there was no NSS survey.
The poverty lines recommended by the Planning Commission [1993] are used and
are as follows. The rural poverty line is given by a per capita monthly expenditure
of Rs. 49 at October 1973-June 1974 all-India rural prices. The urban poverty line
is given by a per capita monthly expenditure of Rs. 57 at October 1973-June 1974
all-India urban prices. See Datt [1995] for more details on the rural and urban cost of
living indices and on the estimation of the poverty measures. The head count index
is estimated from the grouped distributions of per capita expenditure published by
the NSS45, using parameterized Lorenz curves using a methodology detailed in Datt
and Ravallion [1992].
Wage Agricultural wages data is from the Agricultural Wages in India (Ministry of
Agriculture, Government of India) and deflated using the CPIAL. The data spans
the period 1961-1998. It is unavailable for Jammu and Kashmir and after 1992 for
Kerala. No separate wage data is available for the state of Haryana. Data is missing
for Orrissa in 1968. This gives a total of 545 observations. Factory wages data spans
1961-1995. These are defined to include all remunerations capable of being expressed
in monetary terms plus the imputed value of benefits in kind and also payable more
or less regularly in each pay period to factory employees. The wages are expressed
in terms of gross value i.e. before deduction for fines, damages, taxes, provident
funds, employee’s state insurance contribution etc. The source is the Annual Survey
of Industries and are expressed in log real terms per employee.
State output figures come from Estimates of State Domestic Product published by
Department of Statistics, Ministry of Planning, Government of India. These span
the period 1961-1997. Output variables are expressed in log per capita terms. The
sector-wise breakdown of total output is done under the National Industrial Clas-
sification System (NIC) which conforms with the International Standard Industrial
Classification System (ISIC).
Employment data come from the 1963-65, 1974-75, 1977-78, 1983, and 1987-88
44For 11 states (Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa,
Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh, and West Bengal) all rounds have been covered. Because
Haryana only appears as a separate state from Punjab in 1965 we have adopted the including separate
series for these two states from this date onwards.
45Reports from the National Sample Survey Organization, Department of Statistics, Ministry of
Planning, Government of India and Sarvekshena, Journal of the National Sample Survey Organiza-
tion, Department of Statistics, Ministry of Planning, Government of India.
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issues of the Rural Labour Enquiry, National Sample Survey Oﬃce, Government of
India. The data refer to rural labor households, where rural labor is defined as manual
paid activities as opposed to non-manual employment or self-employment.
Policy variables. Education and health expenditure data are from Public Finance
Statistics (Ministry of Finance, Government of India) and Report on Currency and
Finance,(RBI) 1961-1999. The land reform variable is the cumulative number of
land reform acts undertaken by a state, and is from Besley and Burgess 2001. Public
food distribution is food grains measured in tonnes distributed via the Public Food
Distribution system (Bulletin on Food Statistics, Ministry of Food and Agriculture,
Government of India), 1961-1993. It is expressed in per capita terms.
Politics variables. Number of seats won by diﬀerent political parties is from Butler,
Lahiri and Roy, 1991, and is updated for 1992-2000 from the Election Commission
of India state election reports. Center-state alignment variable is from Dasgupta,
Dhillon and Dutta 2001, 1961-1995.46
Household debt data The data used in Table 11 is from the rural labor household
files for the National Sample Survey quinquennial Employment and Unemployment
rounds for 1983, 1987 and 1993.
46State political configurations are held constant between elections.
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STATE
Bank branches  Agri. Wages Primary sector Secondary sector Tertiary sector
per capita, 1961 Rural unbanked Banked Rural Urban (in Rs.) (Rs./ person) (Rs./person) (Rs./ person)
Orissa 0.29 4.10 1.7 52.6 51.9 4.45 755.8 241.0 439.2
(3.76) (1.23) (11.5) (8.7) (1.1) (217.3) (156.6) (283.0)
Bihar 0.34 3.33 1.62 64.2 48.3 4.36 515.2 192.3 281.2
(3.06) (1.07) (6.2) (8.9) (1.1) (154.3) (101.5) (133.7)
Assam 0.38 3.22 2.08 49.6 23.2 5.46 890.1 268.6 597.7
(2.97) (1.48) (8.2) (10.3) (1.1) (317.5) (110.1) (299.6)
Madhya 0.53 3.5 2.9 54.9 49.6 4.26 774.8 318.2 443.6
Pradesh (3.15) (2.12) (8.4) (8.2) (1.4) (294.5) (227.1) (286.5)
Uttar 0.56 3.25 2.52 45.3 49.5 5.36 686.9 254.2 480.6
Pradesh (2.94) (1.59) (7.4) (10.2) (1.7) (189.9) (150.4) (262.6)
W.Bengal 0.66 2.77 3.48 46.2 31.3 6.67 784.5 502.8 795.6
(2.60) (1.99) (16.0) (6.7) (2.1) (317.1) (208.5) (456.5)
Jammu& 0.76 7.06 5.07 34.5 24.9 862.3 233.5 684.3
Kashmir (5.64) (3.30) (8.1) (7.7) (268.9) (95.6) (437.6)
Andhra 0.82 3.17 3.49 45.3 40.7 5.01 766.5 325.5 677.5
Pradesh (2.72) (2.16) (12.9) (9.7) (1.4) (292.1) (240.0) (490.3)
Rajasthan 0.87 4.33 3.4 52.4 39.4 5.47 747.6 254.3 478.4
(3.68) (2.24) (8.3) (9.9) (1.1) (308.5) (152.7) (316.9)
Haryana 1.20 4.46 4.92 29.9 28.4 8.87 1471.5 671.1 909.7
(3.55) (3.09) (6.4) (11.3) (1.7) (577.1) (475.9) (626.2)
Maharashtra 1.43 2.72 5.6 60.5 41.6 4.07 626.1 817.5 1030.5
(2.08) (2.23) (10.7) (5.4) (1.3) (269.1) (493.8) (747.9)
Tamil Nadu 1.53 2.72 4.82 52.2 42.9 4.38 466.4 502.5 710.5
(2.08) (2.23) (12.5) (8.9) (1.2) (128.5) (304.8) (473.5)
Gujarat 1.61 3.88 5.76 48.9 45.3 4.81 791.3 690.1 786.3
(2.73) (2.98) (12.7) (10.4) (1.3) (318.0) (545.6) (469.1)
Karnataka 1.62 4.84 5.77 52.4 43.6 3.97 794.0 402.9 628.0
(3.53) (3.18) (9.0) (10.5) (0.8) (267.6) (217.7) (456.0)
Kerala 1.70 1.1 6.56 50.0 47.8 6.42 577.8 316.2 537.1
(0.74) (3.58) (17.8) (17.8) (1.5) (189.5) (190.5) (284.4)
Punjab 1.75 5.31 6.73 22.7 22.7 8.58 1503.3 1019.6 584.0
(3.67) (3.88) (8.3) (10.3) (1.3) (588.1) (2295.8) (2526.6)
Total 1.00 3.7 4.1 48.1 39.8 5.42 803.5 435.5 627.8
(3.40) (3.00) (14.7) (13.8) (2.0) (411.1) (649.6) (748.8)
Number obs. 636 636 636 627 627 545 579 579 579
The data covers 16 major states, 1961-2000. Haryana enters the sample in 1965 giving a total of 636 possible observations. The final row gives variable-wise observations available.
TABLE 1 -- SUMMARY OF MAIN VARIABLES
OUTPUT
Bank branches, by location 
BANKING POVERTY
Standard deviations in parentheses. Banking and output variables are normalized by 1961 population. Bank variables are expressed per 100,000 persons. See Appendix for details on variable construction.
Head count ratio (percent)
YEAR OTHERS
Banks Cooperatives Relatives and Friends Moneylenders
1951 1.1 4.6 14.4 68.6 9.3
1961 0.3 10.4 5.8 60.9 22.6
1971 2.4 20.1 13.8 36.9 26.8
1981 28.6 28.6 9 16.9 16.9
1991 29 18.6 6.7 15.7 30
Loans from relatives and friends refer to interest-free non-institutional loans. `Others' category includes loans from government, landlords and traders/commissioners.
The data source for 1951 is the "All India Rural Credit Survey", and for all subsequent years "All India Debt and Investment Surveys". 
TABLE 2: SHARE OF RURAL HOUSEHOLD DEBT HELD BY DIFFERENT CREDITORS (percentage)
INSTITUTIONAL SOURCES NON-INSTITUTIONAL SOURCES
Rural bank credit Rural bank saving Priority sector Cooperative
Rural unbanked Banked share share credit share credit share
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Number of bank branches in 1961 0.07** 0.14*** 0.17 -0.02  -0.08 0.41
per capita *(1961-2000) trend (0.03) (0.01) (0.20) (0.23) (0.62) (0.33)
Number of bank branches in 1961 -0.25*** -0.07*** -1.09** -0.82*** 0.08 -0.02
per capita*(1977-2000) trend (0.03) (0.02) (0.43) (0.25) (0.86) (0.41)
Number of bank branches in 1961 0.17*** 0.10** 0.89*** 0.39* -0.18 0.02
per capita*(1990-2000) trend (0.04) (0.04) (0.26) (0.20) (0.33) (0.99)
Post-1976 dummy* (1977-2000) trend 0.34 0.53** -0.30 -0.16 -3.36 -3.64
(0.25) (0.19) (1.49) (0.77) (2.40) (2.22)
Post-1989 dummy*(1990-2000) trend -0.24 -0.40*** 2.03 0.28 -0.04 -3.15
 (0.15) (0.10) (1.52) (0.55) (1.85) (2.61)
State and year dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Other controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Adjusted R-squared 0.96 0.98 0.91 0.92 0.88 0.83
F-test 1 16.87 8.97 12.8 25.67 0 5.75
[0] [0] [0] [0] [0.99] [0.02]
F-test 2 0.49 27.22 0.03 10.35 1.79 0.17
[0.49] [0] [0.86] [0] [0.20] [0.68]
Number observations 636 636 512 512 512 491
TABLE 3: BANKING AS A FUNCTION OF INITIAL FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT
Number branches, by location:
Standard errors clustered by state are reported in parenthesis, p-values are in square brackets.  Explanatory variables reported are  bank branches in 1961 per 100,000 persons interacted with (row-wise)
branches. Priority credit share is share of bank lending going to `priority sector' . Cooperative share is primary agicultural cooperative credit as a percent of cooperative and bank lending. The sample 
covers 16 states (1961-2000). Haryana enters in 1965. Credit and savings data span 1969-2000; cooperative data ends 1992. * indicates significance at 10%, ** significance at 5% and *** significance at 1%.  
(i) a time trend, (ii) a post 1976 dummy and a post 1976 time trend, (iii) a post 1989 dummy and a post-1989 time trend.  'F-test 1' tests if first two row coefficients sum equals zero, and `F-test 2' whether the
sum of coefficients in first three rows equals zero. All regressions include as other controls population density, log state income per capita and log rural locations per capita (measured in 1961). These 
enter the same way as branches per capita in 1961. Branch variables are normalized by 1961 population. Rural bank credit (saving) share is the percent of total bank credit (saving) accounted for by rural
Rural Urban Aggregate Agricultural Factory
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Number of bank branches in 1961 -0.77*** -0.27 -0.71*** -0.003 0.01
per capita *(1961-2000) trend (0.23) (0.24) (0.22) (0.006) (0.02)
Number of bank branches in 1961 1.15** 0.15 0.99*** -0.01* -0.01
per capita*(1977-2000) trend (0.42) (0.26) (0.33) (0.008) (0.02)
Number of bank branches in 1961 -1.15*** -0.31 -1.04*** 0.04** -0.02
per capita*(1990-2000) trend (0.34) (0.38) (0.31) (0.02) (0.01)
Post-1976 dummy* (1977-2000) trend -3.77* -2.76 -3.53** 0.08* 0.04
(1.94) (2.29) (1.71) (0.04) (0.05)
Post-1989 dummy*(1990-2000) trend 1.2 0.5 0.62 -0.04 0.01
(2.39) (0.96) (1.82) (0.05) (0.02)
State and year dummies YES YES YES YES YES
Other controls YES YES YES YES YES
Adjusted R-squared 0.84 0.91 0.88 0.9 0.72
F-test 1 1.5 0.37 1.76 23.95 0.23
[0.24] [0.55] [0.20] [0] [0.63]
F-test 2 2.97 3.95 4.15 1.88 6.07
[0.10] [0.06] [0.05] [0.19] [0.02]
Number observations 627 627 627 545 553
1961-2000.  Haryana enters in 1965. Differences in sample size are due to missing data, details are in Appendix. * indicates  significance at 10%, ** significance at 5% and *** significance at 1%.
TABLE 4: BANK BRANCH EXPANSION AND POVERTY: REDUCED FORM EVIDENCE
 the poverty line. The agricultural wage is log real male daily agricultural wage, and factory wage log real remunerations per worker in registered manufacturing. The sample covers 16 states and spans 
Head count ratio
Standard errors clustered by state are reported in parenthesis, p-values are in square brackets.  Explanatory variables reported are number branches in 1961 per 100,000 persons interacted with (row-wise)
(i) a time trend (t), (ii) an indicator variable=1 if the year>1976, and a post 1976 time trend (t-1976), (iii) an indicator variable=1 if the year>1989 and a post-1989 time trend (t-1989).  'F-test 1' tests if the sum of
coefficients for first two rows equals zero, and `F-test 2' whether sum of coefficients in first three rows equals zero. Other controls are population density, log state income per capita and log rural
locations per capita (measured in 1961). These enter the same way as number of bank branches per capita in 1961.  Head count ratio is the percentage of the population with monthly expenditure below
Wage
State Non-prima Tertiary Employ-
output ry output output ment
Total Total Agriculture  Total Construc- Electricity, Total Rural non-
tion Registered Unregistered water, gas agricultural
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Number of bank branches in 1961 0.01** -0.01 -0.01* 0.02*** -0.02 0.01 0.03* 0.01 0.02** 0.06***
per capita *(1961-2000) trend (0.002) (0.01) (0.004) (0.004) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Number of bank branches in 1961 -0.02*** -0.01 -0.01 -0.03*** 0.02 -0.01 -0.06* -0.07*** -0.03*** -0.06**
per capita*(1977-2000) trend (0.004) (0.01) (0.01) (0.004) (0.04) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Number of bank branches in 1961 0.03*** 0.02** 0.02* 0.03*** 0.02 0.05 0.04* -0.04 0.02***
per capita*(1990-2000) trend (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.05) (0.01)
Post-1976 dummy* (1977-2000) 0.06 0.13** 0.14*** -0.02 0.05 0.12 0.03 0.39* -0.08 5.59
trend (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.12) (0.08) (0.06) (0.21) (0.06) (28.35)
Post-1989 dummy*(1990-2000) 0.07* 0.08** 0.05 0.08* 0.06 -0.02 0.29** 0.92* 0.06
trend (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.08) (0.09) (0.11) (0.49) (0.03)
State and year dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Other controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Adjusted R-squared 0.98 0.94 0.93 0.98 0.98 0.86 0.94 0.96 0.98 0.89
F-test 1 20.25 6.73 4.54 31.4 0.01 0.04 2.69 8.15 5.06 0.09
[0] [0.02] [0.05] [0] [0.94] [0.85] [0.12] [0.18] [0.03] [0.77]
F-test 2 4.65 2.13 1.87 4.47 2.05 3.96 0.38 3.48 4.01
[0.04] [0.16] [0.19] [0.05] [0.17] [0.06] [0.54] [0.08] [0.06]
Number observations 579 579 579 579 577 579 579 561 573 365
in 1965. Sample size variations are due to missing data (see Data Appendix).   * indicates significance at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%.
Standard errors clustered by state are reported in parenthesis,  p-values are in square brackets.  Co-variates are number branches in 1961 per 100,000 persons interacted with: (i) time trend, (ii) a post-1976
dummy, and a post-1976 time trend , (iii) a post-1989 dummy and a post-1989 time trend.   'F-test 1' tests if the sum of coefficients for first two rows equals zero, and `F-test 2' whether sum of coefficients
in first three rows equals zero.  Other controls are population density, log state income per capita and log rural locations per capita (measured in 1961). These enter  the same way as number of branches  
TABLE 5: BANK BRANCH EXPANSION AND OUTPUT: REDUCED FORM EVIDENCE
per capita in 1961. Output is in log real rupees per capita. Non agricultural employment is log non-agri workers as fraction of all rural labor. The sample covers 16 states, and spans 1961-1997.  Haryana enters
Secondary sector outputPrimary sector
Manufacturing
output
Fraction Congress Center-state Land Public food
legislators alignment reform distribution Health and education Other development
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Number of bank branches in 1961 -0.01 -0.04* 0.005 35.62 -0.0004 0.002
per capita *(1961-2000) trend (0.01) (0.02) (0.05) (71.37) (0.0013) (0.001)
Number of bank branches in 1961 0.005 0.04 -0.09 45.54 -0.001 -0.0001
per capita*(1977-2000) trend (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (77.42) (0.0016) (0.0030)
Number of bank branches in 1961 -0.004 0.08 0.08* -20.04 0.0002 -0.001
per capita*(1990-2000) trend (0.017) (0.04) (0.04) (217.92) (0.0019) ( 0.005)
Post-1976 dummy* (1977-2000) 0.14 0.3 -0.85** -530.33 -0.01 -0.002
trend (0.24) (0.27) (0.29) (1029.74) (0.01) (0.01)
Post-1989 dummy*(1990-2000) 0.23** -0.10 -0.54*** 464.14 -0.004 0.01
trend (0.10) (0.34) (0.19) (292.69) (0.01) (0.01)
State and year dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Other controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Adjusted R-squared 0.56 0.59 0.73 0.79 0.72 0.7
F-test 1 0.16 0.01 3.82 0.41 5.32 1.61
[0.69] [0.91] [0.06] [0.53] [0.03] [0.22]
F-test 2 0.33 2.95 0.01 0.16 1.34 0.16
[0.57] [0.10] [0.91] [0.69] [0.26] [0.69]
Number observations 634 539 636 522 613 613
land reform acts (1961-2000); public food distribution is per capita food grains (in tonnes) distributed via public food distribution system (1961-1993). Health and education spending is as share of government
spending (1961-1999). Other development activities includes all other development expenditures excluding health and education. * indicates significance at 10%, ** significance at 5% and *** significance at 1%. 
dummy, and a post-1976 time trend, (iii) a post-1989 dummy and a post-1989 time trend.  'F-test 1' tests if first two row coefficient sum to zero, `F-test 2' whether coefficient sum for first three rows equals zero. 
Other controls are population density, log state income per capita and log rural locations per capita (measured 1961). These enter the same way as number of branches per capita in 1961. Fraction congress 
legislators is the percentage of state legislators belonging to Congress party. Center-state alignment is a dummy=1 when same party is in power in the center and state. Land reform is a cumulative index of state
TABLE 6: BANK BRANCH EXPANSION, POLITICS AND POLICY: REDUCED FORM EVIDENCE
Standard errors clustered by state are reported in parenthesis, p-values in square brackets. Explanatory variables are number branches in 1961 per 10,000 persons interacted with (i) a time trend (ii) a post-1976
POLITICS POLICY
Share of state spending on
Urban Aggregate Agricultural Factory
IV IV IV IV IV IV IV IV
1961-89 1977-2000 survey years
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Number branches opened in rural 2.09** 1.15 -4.74** -0.65 -4.10** -4.70** -6.83** -4.20* 0.07* 0.04
unbanked locations per capita (0.79) (1.02) (1.79) (1.06) (1.46) (1.82) (2.80) (2.26) (0.04) (0.08)
IMPLIED ELASTICITY -0.36 -0.32 0.25
Number of bank branches in 1961 -0.43*** -0.47 -0.26* -0.46* -0.43 -0.79* -0.45 -0.006 0.005
per capita * 1961-2000 trend (0.16) (0.26) (0.13) (0.22) (0.26) (0.44) (0.28) (0.003) (0.01)
Post-1976 dummy* (1977-2000) -0.31 -1.42 -2.06 -1.39 -2.13 -1.31 0.04 0.03
trend (1.22) (2.29) (1.65) (2.03) (2.58) (3.32) (0.05) (0.06)
Post-1989 dummy*(1990-2000) 5.37** -1.08 -0.47 -1.55 -0.45 0.78 0.11 -0.05
trend (2.46) (2.33) (1.01) (1.75) (2.90) (2.61) (0.06) (0.04)
State and year dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Other controls NO YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Overidentification test p- 0.99 0.98 0.99 1 0.99 0.99
value
R-squared 0.82 0.85 0.78 0.92 0.81 0.8 0.8 0.77 0.98 0.7
Number observations 627 627 627 627 627 460 375 375 545 553
Standard errors clustered by state are reported in parenthesis. See notes to Table 4, and Data Appendix for variable descriptions. Branch variables are normalized by 1961 population, and expressed per 100,000 persons.
Other controls are log state income per capita, population density and log rural locations per capita, measured in 1961 and interacted (separately) with a 1961-2000; 1977-2000 and 1990-2000 trend and with post-1976 and 
post-1989 dummies. In IV regressions instruments are number branches in 1961 per capita interacted with (i) a post-1976 dummy and a post-1976 time trend (ii) a post-1989 dummy and a post-1989 time trend respectively. 
Table 3, column (1) reports corresponding first stage regression. The p-value for an overidentification test due to Sargan  [1958]  is reported -- number of observations times R-2 from the regression of stage two 
residuals on the instruments  is distributed chi-squared (T+1) where T is the number of  instruments. * indicates significance at 10%, ** significance at 5% and *** significance at 1%
OLS





State Non-prima Tertiary Employment
output ry output Electricity, total Non-agri
Total Total Agriculture Total Construction Registered Unregistered water, gas output labor
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Number bank branches in rural 0.08*** 0.04 0.01 0.15*** -0.09 0.05 0.29* 0.30** 0.17*** 0.3
unbanked locations per capita (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.19) (0.07) (0.15) (0.13) (0.05) (0.22)
IMPLIED ELASTICITY 0.29 0.55 1.07 1.11 0.62
Number  bank branches in 1961 0.004 -0.01* -0.01** 0.01** -0.01 0.01 0.02* -0.02 0.02* 0.06***
per capita * (1961-2000) trend (0.003) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Post-1976 dummy* (1977-2000) 0.004 0.09** 0.12*** -0.1 0.06 0.06 -0.1 0.38* -0.15* -0.03
trend (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.06) (0.17) (0.06) (0.14) (0.19) (0.08) (0.22)
Post-1989 dummy*(1990-2000) 0.15*** 0.16*** 0.13** 0.14*** 0.18 0.16* 0.33** 0.70* 0.08**
trend (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.11) (0.08) (0.14) (0.35) (0.03)
State and year dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Other controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Overidentification test p-value 0.98 0.97 0.97 0.99 0.91 0.97 0.99 0.98 0.99
Adjusted R-squared 0.96 0.93 0.93 0.96 0.98 0.94 0.82 0.7 0.96 0.88
Number observations 579 579 579 579 577 579 579 561 573 365
Standard errors clustered by state are reported in parenthesis. See notes to Table 4, and Data Appendix for variable descriptions. Branch variables are normalized by 1961 population. Other controls are log state
income, population density and log rural locations per capita, measured in 1961 and interacted (separately) with 1961-2000; 1977-2000 and 1990-2000 trend and with post-1976 and post-1989 dummies. In IV regressions 
the instruments are the number of branches in 1961 per capita interacted with (i) a post-1976 dummy and a post-1976 time trend (ii) a post-1989 dummy and a post-1989 time trend respectively. Table 3, column (1) reports 
the corresponding first stage regression. The p-value for an overidentification test due to Sargan  [1958]  is reported -- the test assumes that number of observations times R-2 from the regression of stage two 
residuals on the instruments  is distributed chi-squared (T+1) where T is the number of  instruments. * indicates significance at 10%, ** significance at 5% and *** significance at 1%
 
TABLE 8: BANK BRANCH EXPANSION AND OUTPUT -- INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES EVIDENCE
Primary sector output Secondary sector output
Manufacturing
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Share of bank credit disbursed -1.49** -0.64 0.02* 0.01 0.03**
by rural branches (0.67) (0.45) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Share of bank savings held by -2.27** -1.09 0.02* 0.01 0.03***
rural branches (0.80) (0.69) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Number  bank branches in 1961 -0.98* -1.56** -0.69** -1.00** 0.01 0.02** -0.001 -0.001 0.01** 0.02**
per capita * (1961-2000) trend (0.48) (0.59) (0.24) (0.36) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Post-1976 dummy* (1977-2000) -3.00* -1.83 -1.64 -1.13 0.05 0.04 0.11** 0.11** -0.02 -0.03
trend (1.62) (2.29) (1.96) (2.55) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.06)
Post-1989 dummy*(1990-2000) 4.56 1.63 2.92 1.65 0.08 0.13*** 0.11 0.14*** 0.05 0.12***
trend (2.64) (2.54) (2.40) (1.27) (0.07) (0.04) (0.07) (0.04) (0.08) (0.04)
State and year dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Other controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Overidentification test p-value 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.95 0.99 0.93 0.99 0.99
Adjusted R-squared 0.72 0.66 0.91 0.89 0.97 0.94 0.98 0.96 0.99 0.97
Number observations 503 503 503 503 463 463 463 463 463 463
Standard errors clustered by state are reported in parenthesis. See Table 4 and 5 notes, and Data Appendix for variable description. All output variables are normalized by 1961 population. Other controls are log
state income, population density and log rural locations per capita, all measured in 1961 and interacted (separately) with a (1961-2000), (1977-2000) and (1990-2000) trend. The instruments are the number of branches
in 1961 per capita interacted separately with (i) a post-1976 dummy and a post-1976 trend, and (ii) a post-1989 dummy and a post-1989 trend respectively. Table 3, columns (3) and (4) report the corresponding first
stage regression. We report the p-value for Sargan overidentification test  [1958]. This assumes number observations times R-2 from a regression of the stage two residuals on the instruments is distributed as 





TABLE 9: THE IMPACT OF RURAL CREDIT AND SAVINGS ON POVERTY AND OUTPUT -- INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES EVIDENCE
Rural Urban Total Primary sector
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Number bank branches in rural -4.04** -4.12** -3.77** -0.83 -1.05 -0.81
unbanked locations per capita (1.83) (1.54) (1.54) (1.08) (1.06) (0.91)
Cumulative land reform -1.87** -1.75** -1.87** 0.45 0.41 0.27
(0.79) (0.70) (0.68) (0.28) (0.29) (0.30)
Health and education -10.97 -3.31 23.52 23.74
spending (30.91) (28.40) (14.53) (14.80)
Other Development -40.84*** -37.32** 6.31 5.73
spending (12.39) (13.37) (12.08) (11.89)
Fraction legislators belonging to:
Congress party -13.07 0.22
(8.90) (3.14)
Janata party -11.62 1.62
(6.90) (3.18)
Hindu party 6.15 9.61
(12.91) (8.36)
Hard left -14.81 1.76
(9.07) (3.72)
Regional parties -15.11 -2.34
(12.91) (4.60)
State and year dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Other controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Overidentification test p-value 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.99
Adjusted R-squared 0.78 0.79 0.81 0.92 0.91 0.91
Number observations 627 605 603 627 605 603
Standard errors clustered by state are reported in parenthesis. Table 4 notes, and Data Appendix provide variable description. Branch variables are normalized by 1961 population. Other controls
are log state income, population density and log rural locations per capita, measured in 1961 and interacted (separately) with a (1961-2000), (1977-2000) and (1990-2000) trend. Instruments are number
branches in 1961 per capita interacted with (i) a post-1976 dummy and a post-1976 time trend (ii) a post-1989 dummy and a post-1989 trend respectively. * indicates significance at 10%, ** significance
 at 5% and *** significance at 1%.
TABLE 10: BANK BRANCH EXPANSION AND POVERTY REDUCTION -- IV ESTIMATES WITH TIME VARYING CONTROLS
Urban head count ratioRural head count ratio
No land 0- 0.1 0.1-0.5 0.5-2.5 more than 2.5 
Proportion of households with a bank 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.1 0.12
loan
Proportion of households with a 0.14 0.15 0.18 0.19 0.24
moneylender loan
Number of observations 9,619 25,350 16,581 13,824 2,764
The proportion of households with a bank loan refer to the fraction of households in a given land category with atleast one outstanding bank loan.
Moneylender borrowing is similarly defined. The means are computed for the sample of rural labor households in the NSS quinquennial employment
and unemployment surveys for the years 1983, 1987 and 1993.
Land ownership in acres
TABLE 11: LAND OWNERSHIP AND BORROWING BY RURAL HOUSEHOLDS IN INDIA, 1983-1993
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Total banked locations Rural banked locations Branches in already banked locations
                   
 
FIGURE 1: GROWTH OF BANK BRANCHES IN INDIA            
Notes: All variables refer to the cumulative number of branches (of that type) . These variables are constructed using information from the Reserve  




















Figure 2: Rural credit and saving in Indian states
year
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Notes: The rural credit and savings share, denoted as rurcrsh and rursavsh respectively, refer to the fraction of total commercial bank credit and savings which are disbursed via rural 
bank branches. The Data Appendix provides information on the construction of these variables.   
Figure 3: Poverty across Indian States
year
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Notes: The rural and urban head count ratios refer to the percentage rural and urban population with monthly expenditure less than the official poverty line. The Data Appendix 
provides further information on construction of the variables. 
Figure 4: Output across Indian states
year
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Notes: The primary sector output is the real state domestic product accounted for by agriculture and allied activities, and non-primary sector output is the real state domestic product 
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FIGURE 5: POPULATION PER BANK BRANCH ACROSS 16 INDIAN STATES 
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FIGURE 6: INITIAL FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND BRANCH EXPANSION INTO RURAL UNBANKED LOCATIONS 
Notes: This figure graphs the coefficients for  two regressions.  The series “Rural banked locations (no controls) “ graphs  the set of “number  of banked locations in 1961” Xyear 
interaction terms  from the regression given in  Equation (1), and the  series “Rural banked locations (with controls)”  graphs  the corresponding set of  interaction terms  from the 
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FIGURE 7: INITIAL FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND BRANCH EXPANSION IN ALREADY BANKED LOCATIONS 
Notes: This figure graphs the set of  “Number  of banked locations in 1961 × Year” Interaction terms  from a regression in which the dependent variable is the number of branches 
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FIGURE 8: INITIAL FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND RURAL CREDIT SHARE 
Notes: This figure graphs the set of  “Number  of banked locations in 1961 × Year” Interaction terms  from a regression in which the dependent variable is the share of bank credit 














1961 1965 1969 1973 1977 1981 1985 1989 1993 1997
rural head count ratio urban head count ratio
 
FIGURE 9: INITIAL FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND POVERTY 
Notes: This figure graphs the coefficients for  two regressions.  The series “Rural head count ratio”  graphs  the set of  “Number  of banked locations in 1961 × Year”  interaction 
terms  from the regression in which the dependent variable is rural head count ratio; the series “Urban head count ratio”  graphs  the corresponding set of  interaction terms  from the 
regression  in which the dePendent variable is urban head count ratio.  Both regressions include population, income and location controls,    
